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1  Introduction
This article examines the question whether property law can and should 
foster democratic forms of governance, advance social justice, promote citi-
zenship and build sustainable and supportive communities.1 The question is 
particularly relevant in post-apartheid South Africa, since apartheid land law 
worked in exactly the opposite direction. “Grand apartheid”2 undermined 
what would normally be considered democratic forms of governance and 
citizenship because it institutionalised discriminatory and socially divisive 
and destructive agricultural and urban land use policies and management 
systems, thereby causing or exacerbating overcrowding, social displacement 
and economic marginalisation.3 At the same time, the discriminatory land-
use and – management laws and practices of “petty apartheid” systematically 
destroyed any possibility of fostering social justice, good citizenship and 
* Hosted by Stellenbosch University, funded by the Department of Science and Technology and adminis-
tered by the National Research Foundation  This article forms part of a larger research project on property 
theory which was made possible by financial assistance from the National Research Foundation (NRF 
grant number GUN 2050532) and Stellenbosch University  The views set out in the article are those of 
the author and should not be attributed to any of these institutions  Thanks to Gustav Muller and Zsa-Zsa 
Temmers for research assistance  
1 A shorter version of the article was presented at a conference entitled “Property in Comparative 
Perspective” presented by the Department of Law, University of Durham and the Center on Property Law, 
Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurship, Syracuse University College of Law, at Durham Castle, 18-19 
July 2007  The question whether property can serve these goals was posed to speakers at the conference  
For purposes of the article I read the term “property” widely to refer to property theories, institutions, 
rules and practices
2 This term is used to describe the macro level of apartheid land law, which designated specific areas 
of the country as so-called “homelands” for specific Black African tribal or national groups  Four of 
these “homelands” became “independent” and exercised a measure of self-rule prior to 1994, ie Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (so-called “TBVC countries”)  Grand apartheid is usually contrasted 
with “petty apartheid”, which refers to the reservation of residential areas as well as public and private 
facilities within “white” South Africa for exclusive use and occupation by certain race groups  See in 
general Van der Walt “Towards the Development of Post-Apartheid Land Law: An Exploratory Survey” 
1990 (23) De Jure 1-45 and sources referred to there
3 Several contributions in Cross & Haines (eds) Towards Freehold: Options for Land and Development in 
South Africa’s Black Rural Areas (1988) discuss the disastrous effects of the so-called agricultural “bet-
terment” schemes and similar land practices and the link between apartheid land law and overcrowding  
In urban areas, the establishment of separate “townships” for Black, Coloured and Indian residents (like 
Soweto, an acronym for “South Western Townships”, an area southwest of Johannesburg reserved for 
urban residential use by Blacks) outside the white urban areas resulted in overcrowding, bad urban plan-
ning, immense transport problems and high levels of pollution  See the sources referred to in n 4 below
the building of sustainable and supportive communities .4 The advent of the 
post-1994 democratic dispensation in South Africa and the concomitant con-
stitutional directives to eradicate the legacy of apartheid and to promote the 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom5 present a felicitous opportunity 
to ask whether the post-1994 political, constitutional and social dispensation 
can reverse the legacy of apartheid by, among other things, fostering demo-
cratic forms of governance and citizenship and advancing social justice and 
the building of sustainable and supportive communities.
It would be impossible to undertake a full analysis of all the aspects involved 
in this question in an article of limited scope. A comprehensive analysis would 
require discussion of issues such as the tension between security of vested 
property interests, economic development and post-apartheid land reform;6 the 
implications for effective land reform of promoting economic development;7 
restitution of dispossessed property as a prerequisite for promoting social 
4 One merely needs to reflect upon the destruction of rural communities through the migrant labour system 
on the one hand and overcrowding on the other; see in this regard Van der Merwe “Not Slavery but a 
Gentle Stimulus: Labour-Inducing Legislation in the South African Republic” 1989 TSAR 353; as well as 
the contributions in Cross & Haines (eds) Towards Freehold  Another vivid example is the forced re movals 
(3,5 million people between 1960 and 1983) that were intended to “clean up” and consolidate racially 
segregated areas; these mass evictions destroyed established and vibrant urban communities like District 
Six (Cape Town) and Sophiatown (Johannesburg) and left millions of Black South Africans displaced and 
homeless  See in general Schoombee “Group Areas Legislation – The Political Control of Ownership and 
Occupation of Land” 1985 Acta Juridica 77; Platzky & Walker The Surplus People: Forced Removals 
in South Africa (1985)  More specifically on the destruction of District Six and Sophiatown see Mattera 
Memory is the Weapon (1987); Rassool District Six: Lest we Forget – Recapturing Subjugated Histories 
of Cape Town (1897-1956) (2000); Themba Requiem for Sophiatown (2006)  A more subtle but no less 
destructive process was the legal redefinition of segregated land rights under apartheid that left Black 
land users and occupiers open to arbitrary evictions and forced removals; see in this regard Van der Walt 
1990 De Jure 1-45; Van der Walt “Property Rights and Hierarchies of Power: A Critical Evaluation of 
Land-Reform Policy in South Africa” 1999 (64) Koers 259 and sources referred to there
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 1, 7(1), read with ss 8(3), 39  In the so-called ‘post-
amble’ of the interim 1993 Constitution the obligation to transform South African society and its laws, 
as an integral part of the new democratic dispensation, was made even clearer  As far as property law is 
concerned, the obligation to transform is embodied in s 25; see the discussion below
6 The link between economic development and security is often claimed but has not yet been demonstrated 
adequately in the literature  An example of the argument in favour of such a link was forwarded by 
the (white) agricultural society, Agri SA, claiming that the state’s land reform interventions in private 
landownership caused uncertainty and affected the economy unfavourably, especially in terms of labour 
and food security: Bosman “Grondteikens Moet Ander Doelwitte in Ag Neem” Landbouweekblad (2005-
11-11) 106  This argument relies on what Alexander The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) 24 et seq calls “the formalist trap”, described at 24 
as “the assumption or claim that without constitutional protection, property rights are unlikely to enjoy 
the degree of security and stability that is necessary for a properly functioning liberal democracy as well 
as for an efficient free market economy ” Alexander argues, with reference to Canada and India, that 
constitutional entrenchment of property is not a requirement for a liberal democracy or for an efficient 
free market economy  See further Bhorat & Kanbur (eds) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa (2006)
7 It is sometimes assumed that the two goals are mutually exclusive, but it has been argued that the consti-
tutional protection of property can simultaneously promote a transformative agenda: see Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law (2005) 22-42; Van der Walt “Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing, 
Limiting and Deconstructing Property Rights in the Constitutional State” 2001 SALJ 258; Van der Walt 
“Striving for the Better Interpretation – A Critical Reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harksen 
and FNB Decisions on the Property Clause” 2004 SALJ 854  The latter argument was accepted by the 
Constitutional Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23  
See further Alexander & Skąpska (eds) A Fourth Way. Privatization, Property, and the Emergence of 
New Market Economy (1994)
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justice;8 promoting security of tenure against eviction and the implications for 
housing policy;9 promoting access to land and housing and the implications 
for individual autonomy, private investment and economic development;10 the 
apparent conflict between communal tenure and promotion of equality and 
democratic governance in land-use policy;11 building supportive communities 
and promoting citizenship in view of concerns about personal security and 
8 In South African land reform law, restitution is a limited process whereby specific property that was 
dispossessed under apartheid laws and practices is restored to the affected individuals, families or com-
munities  The process is authorised by s 25(7) of the 1996 Constitution and regulated by the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994  The original deadline for completing all restitution claims was 30 April 1998; 
in terms of policy decisions all claims had to be processed and dealt with by 31 December 2005 (subse-
quently extended to 31 December 2008)  In July 2006 the Land Claims Commission had settled 89 percent 
of the claims that had been lodged before the final cut-off date – the remaining 11 percent were expected 
to be completed by 2008  Of the 79 696 claims received, 71 645 were settled; 6 975 of the remaining 
claims were in rural areas where conflicting claims and negotiations involving large and often partially 
dispersed groups complicated the process  Most of the urban claimants preferred financial compensa-
tion, for which R1,2 billion was allocated by the state  See http://www businessday co za/ PrintFriendly
aspx?ID=BD4A226973 (accessed 11-01-2007)  Even early in 2003, when less than half of the current 
number of claims had been settled (36 686), more than 80 000 households (almost 450 000 individuals) 
had benefited from the more than 500 000 hectares that had been restored up to then  See the report 
of the Land Claims Commission Land Restitution in South Africa: Our Achievements and Challenges 
(26 May 2003) 4 Table 2 4 at http://land pwv gov za/restitution/LAND%20RESTITUTION%20IN%20
SOUTH%20AFRICA%20-%2020-05-03_ doc (accessed 25-01-2007)  Restitution is a problem outside of 
South Africa as well; see eg Pogany Righting Wrongs in Eastern Europe (1997) 227; Teitel Transitional 
Justice (2000) 310
9 In South African land reform law, tenure reform is authorised by s 25(6) of the Constitution  Given the role 
that evictions and forced removals played in apartheid land law, security of tenure in the post-apartheid 
context obviously means security from arbitrary eviction  Legislation now secures the land rights and 
interests of labour tenants, other lawful occupiers of rural land, urban rental tenants, communal land hold-
ers and users, informal and beneficial land users and even unlawful occupiers of land  The relevant land 
reform laws are respectively the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, the Communal Property Associations Act 
28 of 1996 and the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, the Interim Protection of Informal Land 
Rights Act 31 of 1996, and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
19 of 1998  For a discussion of these statutes see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 284-398 and 
sources cited there  Security of tenure, especially in the residential sphere, is a problem elsewhere as well; 
see Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) 568
10 Promotion of access to land and housing is authorised by ss 25(5) and 26 of the Constitution  Within its 
budgetary and institutional restrictions, the new government has set redistribution targets for itself  The 
prime objective is to upgrade all informal settlements in the country by 2015, which means building 
a further 500 000 houses per annum from 2008: see Business Report (2007-01-29) available at http://
www busrep co za/ (accessed 29-01-2007)  By September 2006 some 2 243 612 houses had already been 
completed: http://www housing gov za/ (accessed 29-01-2007)  According to Xundu & Boyle “State Fears 
Protests over Lack of Delivery” SA Sunday Times (2007-01-28) 10, the completed houses provided housing 
for some 8,4 million people, leaving about 2,4 million households living in informal settlements  Of these, 
800 000 are on approved subsidy lists, waiting for their houses to be completed  As far as agricultural 
land is concerned, the aim of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub-programme is to 
redistribute 30% of agricultural land by 2014: http://land pwv gov za/ redistribution/lrad htm (accessed 
05-02-2007)  For an overview see McLean “Housing” in Chaskalson, Klaaren, Roux, Stein & Woolman 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2006) Ch 55
11 The Constitution commits the State to three principles that affect communal land holding, viz recogni-
tion and development of customary law and traditional leadership (ss 39(2)-(3), 211-212); equality and 
non-discrimination (s 9); and security of tenure (ss 25(6), 25(9))  The problems surrounding reform of 
communal land holding include security of tenure and arbitrary eviction (management and governance); 
gender discrimination and equality; economic and sustainable use; and others  Significant legislative 
interventions include the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 (enables especially restitution 
of land to groups and communities within an updated and constitutionally “sanitised” communal context) 
and the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 (intended to improve security of tenure of individu-
als and communities who hold or use or occupy land communally); on both statutes see Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 284-398  
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the growth of privately secured residential developments;12 transforming the 
common law of property;13 dismantling the apartheid land hierarchies that 
are seen as a structural cause of inequality and poverty;14 and many others. I 
chose to discuss just three examples from recent legislation and case law that 
highlight areas where it can be asked whether property law can promote the 
political, constitutional and social transformation processes that are required 
in the aftermath of apartheid and that are the focus of this article. Two of the 
examples I selected are from what is sometimes described as “pure” private 
law, where it is often claimed that property relationships and transactions are 
adequately regulated by private law, with no need or room for interference 
from the state. The third example derives from post-apartheid land reform 
law, which is generally (and arguably erroneously) regarded as part of public 
rather than private law.
2  Sale of residential property to satisfy a debt
When a South African home owner defaults on her bond payments, the 
creditor (usually a bank) would approach the courts for default judgment 
against the debtor, simultaneously asking for an ancillary order to declare 
the mortgaged property executable.15 This attachment and execution practice 
existed and has been applied, more or less without controversy, for a number 
of years. In 2001 a case occurred where the execution procedure of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 194416 was used to levy execution against the 
owners of low-cost houses acquired through a state housing programme. The 
12 Because of popular perceptions that criminal threats to personal security and exposure to violent crime 
are increasing, the development of enclosed urban residential areas has become popular in South African 
cities recently  See South African Human Rights Commission Report on the Issue of Road Closures, 
Security Booms and Related Measures (10 March 2005) http://www sahrc org za/Publications htm 
(accessed 05-11-2005)  It has been argued that this development impoverishes public space and under-
mines good citizenship and the building of communities: Van der Walt “Enclosed Property and Public 
Streets” 2006 SA Public Law 3 (three further articles from a seminar on enclosed housing estates are 
included in the same issue of SA Public Law). The issue is also problematic in the USA; see Alexander 
“The Publicness of Private Land Use Controls” 1999 (3) Edinburgh LR 176; Alexander “Dilemmas of 
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community” 1989 (75) Cornell LR 1  
13 It has been said that the 1996 South African Constitution is a post-liberal document that authorises and 
requires social and legal transformation: see Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” 
1998 SAJHR 146  On this basis it can be argued that the Constitution authorises and requires transforma-
tion of the South African Roman-Dutch tradition; see ss 8(3), 39(2) of the Constitution, compare further 
Van der Walt “Property Theory and the Transformation of Property Law” in Cooke (ed) Modern Studies 
in Property Law (2005) 361; Van der Walt “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Development of 
South African Property Law I” 2005 TSAR 655, Van der Walt “Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Development of South African Property Law II” 2006 TSAR 1; Van der Walt “Legal History, Legal 
Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy” 2006 (12) Fundamina 1
14 It has been said that apartheid land established hierarchies of rights that made it possible to privilege white 
land rights over Black occupation interests: Van der Walt 1999 Koers 259  The implication is that transfor-
mation has to dismantle these hierarchies  This argument was cited with approval by the Constitutional 
Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23
15 In accordance with s 27A of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, together with rule 31(5) of the Uniform 
Rules of Court  A similar procedure exists for proceedings in the magistrates’ courts: ss 66(1)(a) and 67 
of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944  The Minister of Justice can limit the jurisdiction of the magis-
trates’ courts with reference to the amount involved; in terms of Government Gazette 16318 of 1995-05-01 
the amount now stands at R100 000, but the parties can agree to the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court 
when higher amounts are in dispute (s 45)  
16 See n 15 above
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execution procedure was implemented in this particular instance to satisfy 
relatively minor debts that were not secured by bonds or related to acquisition 
of the property (“extraneous debts”).17 Sale in execution of the houses in ques-
tion would have resulted in eviction of the indigent debtors and loss of their 
houses but, more importantly, having lost the houses they would not have been 
eligible for state housing again. The sale in execution was opposed and the 
matter ended up in the Constitutional Court, resulting in one of that Court’s 
most fascinating decisions: Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz.18 The 
matter was decided on the basis of section 26, the right to housing provision 
in the 1996 Constitution.
Section 26 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing; that the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other steps, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisa-
tion of that right; and that no one may be evicted from their home without a 
court order made after considering all the relevant circumstances.19 In Jaftha 
the Constitutional Court decided that sale in execution of residential property 
as allowed for in the Magistrates’ Courts Act imposed a limitation upon the 
affected owners’ right of access to housing and that such a limitation could 
only be justified20 if the execution process was accompanied by proper “judi-
cial oversight”.21 Since such oversight was not provided for in the Act, the 
Court read a suitable provision into the Act22 to make it clear that execution of 
residential property and eviction should not take place without a court having 
considered the justification of the procedure in view of all the circumstances.
Jaftha dealt with a case where the debt was not secured by a bond and 
under the circumstances it was reasonably easy to conclude that execution 
and eviction would be unjustifiable, particularly because the execution 
procedure was obviously being abused. However, in subsequent cases the 
question arose whether the established practice of obtaining summary 
judgment and execution was still possible in “normal” cases, where a bank 
issues summons against borrowers who default on repayment of loans 
17 The original debts were cash loans made to buy food from local shops; they varied between R250 and 
R500
18 2005 2 SA 140 (CC)
19 On the interpretation of this provision see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 354-369; McLean 
“Housing” in Constitutional Law Ch 55
20 In terms of s 36(1), which provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the 
nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose  On this 
provision see Woolman & Botha “Limitations” in Constitutional Law Ch 34
21 The term “judicial oversight” indicates that the warrant of execution may not, as the practice was, simply 
be issued by a clerk of a magistrates’ court or the registrar of the High Court without consideration of the 
possible limitation of s 26(1) rights by the execution  It can only be granted by a court after considering 
the justifiability of the limitation in view of all the circumstances; see the Jaftha case para 60
22 “Reading in” is one of the options that South African courts can resort to if legislation is found to fall short 
of constitutional requirements, particularly when the relevant provisions are in some way inadequate to 
allow interpretation in conformity with the Constitution (the other options being “reading down” when 
the provisions are overbroad, severance or, in extreme cases, declaring the provisions unconstitutional 
and invalid)  See Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 2 ed (2002) 142; De Ville Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation (2000) 139-140
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secured by mortgage bonds. In a number of instances the High Courts 
concluded or assumed that Jaftha had set higher standards for execution 
against residential property, even in “normal” cases,23 and the creditors 
applying for execution were therefore required to show (by sufficient and 
suitable allegations in the writ of execution) that the execution would be 
justified under sections 26 and 36 of the Constitution, taking into account 
all the circumstances, including the effect of execution and eviction upon 
the defaulting debtor and his or her family. Other courts interpreted the 
effect of Jaftha differently and routine execution practice consequently 
became controversial because of uncertainty as to what must be alleged to 
justify an order for execution.
The main issue, namely whether Jaftha should apply to the “normal” 
procedure of summary judgment and execution for a loan secured by a 
mortgage bond and, if it should, whether the procedures for sale in execution 
in the Magistrates’ Courts Act and in the High Court Rules protected the 
interests of homeowners sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of section 
26 of the Constitution, was eventually placed before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson.24 The Court 
underlined the value and commercial importance of mortgage bonds25 and 
pointed out that the problems highlighted in Jaftha did not necessarily apply 
23 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Snyders and Eight Similar Cases 2005 5 SA 610 (C); Nedbank Ltd v 
Mortinson 2005 6 SA 462 (T)  The deputy judge president of the Cape High Court issued an instruction 
that proceedings in instances like this should not be disposed of by the registrar but should be enrolled 
for hearing in open court  The Cape High Court granted judgment for the outstanding debt but declined 
to declare the mortgaged property executable, reasoning that the summonses were deficient in that they 
lacked allegations to show that an order for execution would be constitutionally permissible in accordance 
with Jaftha: Standard Bank v Snyders paras 23-25  In Nedbank v Mortinson para 33 the Johannesburg 
High Court held that these applications should be heard in open court, adding that writs of execution 
should contain a note drawing judgment debtors’ attention to the provisions of rule 31(5)(d)  Rule 45(1) 
was amended by an order to read into that rule the words “and a court, after consideration of all rel-
evant circumstances, has authorized execution against the immovable property”  Similar instructions 
were issued in the Natal High Court  In Campus Law Clinic (University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban) v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2006 6 BCLR 669 (CC) para 14 the Constitutional Court pointed out 
the differences between the reactions of the Cape and the Johannesburg High Courts: in Nedbank Ltd v 
Mortinson the Johannesburg High Court (a) did not hold that the summons needed to contain allegations 
in relation to s 26 of the Constitution, whereas the Cape High Court in Standard Bank v Snyders did; (b) 
the Johannesburg Court held that it would be appropriate for the registrar to grant an order for execution 
against immovable property in certain circumstances, whereas the Cape Court made no such finding; 
and (c) the Johannesburg High Court held that rule 45(1) was unconstitutional and remedied it by reading 
certain words into the rule, whereas the Cape High Court made no such finding  
24 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA)  In a sequel to the Saunderson case, the Campus Law Clinic of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) approached the Constitutional Court with an application for leave to appeal 
against the Supreme Court of Appeal decision (n 23)  The Constitutional Court recognised that the situ-
ation was now uncertain and that there is a public interest in the question regarding the circumstances 
in which a creditor might execute against mortgaged property and the procedure to be followed before 
the execution is permitted; it also accepted that the question raises an important constitutional issue as 
reflected in the Jaftha case  However, it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave for appeal in this 
instance because many of the matters raised in the application go to the question of the constitutionality 
of s 27A of the Supreme Court Act and rule 31 of the Uniform Rules of Court; matters that were not raised 
in either the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Saunderson case  For much the same 
reason, allowing the application for direct access to the Constitutional Court would imply placing it in 
the position as court of first and last instance, which is not favoured by the Court  Hence the alternative 
application for direct access was also dismissed
25 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) paras 2-3
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to “normal” sales in execution according to the High Court Rules.26 The 
mere fact that the property to be executed was residential is not enough 
to conclude that an infringement of section 26(1) will necessarily follow; 
therefore a sale in execution should normally, where there is no indication 
or allegation of abuse of court procedure, be allowed to proceed against 
a home specially bonded for the debt sought to be recovered.27 However, 
despite the Supreme Court of Appeal’s rather cautious and restrictive read-
ing of the effect of the Jaftha decision, it is significant that the High Courts 
nevertheless appear extremely vigilant to ensure that defaulting debtors are 
not evicted in contravention of the section 26(3) principle. The care taken by 
the High Courts to ensure that defaulting debtors are alerted to the potential 
infringement of their section 26 rights must be applauded; it demonstrates 
the awareness of potential constitutional implications that one would expect 
of the courts in dealing with even seemingly mundane, everyday matters in 
the constitutional dispensation.28
The Saunderson decision obviously has enormous implications for the 
economy, but it also shows that what seems like a purely technical issue, 
namely attachment and execution practice, cannot be restricted to its 
(admittedly important) procedural or economic considerations, because it 
also affects the efficacy of the government’s land and housing programmes. 
It is therefore also pertinent to the question whether property can help 
foster democratic forms of governance, advance social justice, promote 
citizenship and build sustainable and supportive communities. Despite the 
potentially negative economic impact that stricter judicial control over sale 
in execution could have in “normal” mortgage situations, it is important that 
the Constitutional Court’s decision in Jaftha should not be marginalized 
or played down. Jaftha established the significant constitutional principle 
26 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) paras 8-9: the debt in Saunderson 
was a home loan secured by a mortgage bond; in Jaftha it was an unrelated (extraneous) and unsecured 
debt  Furthermore, the execution procedure in s 66(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act differs from that 
prescribed in High Court rule 31
27 Paras 20, 19  In suitable cases the defendant can show that an order for execution will infringe s 26(1) 
rights, but a bank could not be expected to justify the grant of such an order in advance  The Court 
nevertheless laid down a rule of practice requiring that a summons in which an order for execution of 
immovable property is sought should inform the defendant that her right of access to adequate housing 
might be implicated: para 25  The practice direction was set out in para 27: “The summons initiating 
action in which a plaintiff claims relief that embraces an order declaring immovable property execut-
able shall, from the date of this judgment [15 December 2005], inform the defendant as follows: ‘The 
defendant’s attention is drawn to s 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which accords 
to everyone the right to have access to adequate housing  Should the defendant claim that the order for 
execution will infringe that right it is incumbent on the defendant to place information supporting that 
claim before the Court ’” In ABSA Bank Ltd v Xonti 2006 5 SA 289 (C) the procedural safeguard was 
extended even further, the Cape High Court holding that the execution process should be instituted by 
notice of motion, as the substantive consideration of all the circumstances that is required cannot be 
dispensed with in terms of rule 6(11) notice procedure
28 Various High Courts adopted a practice to ensure that defaulting debtors are alerted to the potential 
infringement of their s 26(3) rights; see n 23 and n 27 above  In Menqa v Markom 2008 2 SA 120 (SCA) 
the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the Jaftha principles apply to sales in execution that occurred 
prior to Jaftha, because no order had been made (in terms of s 172(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution) in that case 
to restrict the retrospective functioning of the declaration of invalidity  In addition, the Court held that 
s 70 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act does not apply to (and thus cannot save) a sale in execution that was 
null and void for having breached the judgment debtor’s constitutional rights  Accordingly, title cannot be 
transferred to further purchasers, even if they buy for value and in good faith
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that court procedures that have been established to facilitate “normal” com-
mercial processes may not be abused to exploit or exacerbate the economic 
and social weakness and marginality of the poor, especially when doing so 
has a negative impact on state efforts to alleviate homelessness,29 but this 
should not create the false impression that judicial oversight is required only 
in these extreme situations. It is therefore gratifying to note that the courts 
are careful post Jaftha not to restrict the effects of the decision unduly: even 
whilst acknowledging the importance of protecting commercial interests 
the courts remain alert to the possibility that section 26(1) rights might be 
threatened by execution procedures. The balance between the two sets of 
interests is then established by expecting that potentially negatively affected 
homeowners should raise and prove the existence of a threat to their section 
26 rights, whereupon the courts must consider the justification of allowing 
execution in view of all the circumstances.
In an exhaustive recent study Lorna Fox30 has indicated that the tension 
between “the commercial interest in property as capital, or as an invest-
ment asset” and “the home interests of occupiers”, which is the issue at the 
heart of the Jaftha decision, is also relevant outside of post-apartheid South 
Africa. Fox argues that, whereas the English legislature has stepped in to 
protect residential occupiers against arbitrary eviction by their landlords, 
protection against eviction by a secured creditor is not necessarily equally 
strong. This may be attributable to the fact that “the occupier’s home interest 
is not regarded as sufficiently strong to outweigh the creditor’s commercial 
claim to be paid, usually by realising the capital value of the property”,31 
primarily because property theory lacks a suitable “organising framework” 
within which a convincing argument in support of that interest can be made. 
Mirroring the transformative perspective of South African post-apartheid 
land reform and housing policy quite strikingly, without referring to it, Fox 
suggests that:
“[G]reater recognition of the occupier’s home interest is not going to result in disregarding the credi-
tor’s interest but, at most, in striking a different balance between the claims, perhaps by requiring 
that the creditor is, in certain circumstances, required to suffer a delay in the enforcement of his legal 
rights over property.”32
This is exactly the result that judicial oversight and contextual leniency 
very often has had in important eviction cases decided under section 26(3) 
29 It is clear that the “normal” execution processes (aimed at foreclosure on home loans secured by a special 
mortgage bond) were cynically abused by the creditors and perhaps by their legal representatives in 
the specific facts of the Jaftha case; the Constitutional Court referred allegations about unprofessional 
conduct to the Law Society for investigation: Jaftha para 65  The abuse of legal process that was high-
lighted by Jaftha is not restricted to unsecured debts, although the nature of the debt and the existence 
of a mortgage bond is a factor to be taken into account in terms of the judicial oversight imposed by the 
decision  Theoretically, predatory lending practices could be relevant in future cases where the debt has 
been secured by a mortgage bond
30 Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies 33-78
31 75-76
32 96
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of the South African Constitution and the anti-eviction provisions in the land 
reform legislation: not necessarily permanently to prevent eviction but at least 
temporarily to delay it to ensure that prescribed procedures are followed and 
that the effect of eviction for affected families is just and constitutionally jus-
tifiable, considering all the circumstances.33
Such an alternative balancing of commercial investment interests and occu-
piers’ home interests in residential property can play a large part in developing 
property rules and practices that advance social justice, promote citizenship 
and build sustainable and supportive communities. In the context of English 
law – the same holds for South African law and probably also for European 
Union law – Fox argues convincingly that this requires the development of a 
new “organising framework” in property theory; in fact, she has done much 
to inspire and direct the required theoretical development. In South African 
post-apartheid land reform and housing law the issues are largely similar, 
although the historical and constitutional context arguably makes it easier to 
justify and conceptualise the necessary changes. Interestingly, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (together with other related recent developments in English 
law) is having the effect of making comparative study of English and South 
African law rewarding, particularly in the area of what Fox would perhaps 
refer to as “home interest” law.
3  Compensation for improvements by lessees
The question whether lessees of residential urban land have a compen-
sation claim, secured by a lien, for improvements they made to the land 
during the currency of the lease has been in dispute in South African law 
for a long time. Improvements made with the consent of the landowner 
are not the problem; the question is whether the tenant can claim com-
pensation for improvements made without the owner’s consent. Since the 
decision of the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Van Wezel 
v Van Wezel’s Trustee34 it was widely (albeit not uniformly) accepted that 
the Dutch Placaeten of 1658 and 169635 applied to both rural and urban 
33 See eg President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and 
Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 
Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 ZACC 1 (19 February 2008)  The latter 
decision is particularly important because it imposes a duty on local authorities and unlawful occupi-
ers to engage with each other in good faith and seriously before approaching the court for an eviction 
order
34 1924 AD 409 416
35 The Placaeten (like the Politieke Ordonnantie referred to in n 37 below) were statutes of the Dutch 
province of Holland, in this case to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship; they formed part of 
the Roman-Dutch law that was received as the basis of early South African law  The Placaeten 
were one of the most important forms of legislation issued by the Dutch provinces during the 17th 
and 18th centuries, and were collected in the 10 volume Cau & Scheltus (eds) Groot Plakkaat Boek 
(1658-1796); see Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 544
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land and that the prohibitions in those ancient laws prevented lessees in 
both cases from claiming compensation for improvements made without 
the permission of the landowner.36 In an extensive historical and doctrinal 
analysis Sonnekus recently concluded that the Placaeten indeed applied to 
urban as well as rural land and that the established practice was therefore 
correct.37 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently38 held that 
the Placaeten did not apply to urban land, thereby contradicting Sonnekus 
and overturning what was widely regarded as the established position.39 In 
the Court’s view, the hypothesis that the Placaeten also applied to urban 
36 This position was recently confirmed in Syfrets Participation Bonds Managers Ltd v Estate and Co-op 
Wine Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 106 (W); Palabora Mining Co Ltd v Coetzer 1993 3 SA 306 
(T); Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 95 (W)  In 
the latter case (para 13) the Johannesburg High Court pointed out that, while academic opinion on the 
issue was divided, the weight of judicial authority favours the view that the Placaeten applied to both 
urban and rural tenements  In any event, the Court considered itself bound by the Appellate Division’s 
decision in Van Wezel v Van Wezel’s Trustee 1924 AD 409 416  It should be noted that the distinction 
between urban and rural land is significant in both Roman and modern South African law, but for 
different reasons and obviously under very different circumstances  Under apartheid, rural land was all 
land not included (by legislation) in the jurisdiction of a local authority; this was changed by the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 
117 of 1998, according to which all land now falls under the jurisdiction of a local authority  In the 
context of landlord and tenant law the racial aspect plays a large role in modern South African law, inter 
alia because Black tenancy was much rarer on agricultural land than on urban land  Protective legisla-
tion was always aimed largely at urban lessees; urban tenancy is still regulated separately by the Rental 
Housing Act 50 of 1999, while lawful occupation of rural land is regulated by the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997  The separation is partly due to different use and occupation patterns in rural 
and urban areas, and partly a legacy of the apartheid tradition, according to which Black occupiers of 
rural land enjoyed either customary-type land rights on Black land or limited occupation rights as farm 
labourers on white land, whereas a form of westernised occupation rights was recognised in favour of 
tenants in the urban areas
37 Sonnekus “Huurders, Eiegeregtigde Huurverlenging Verpak as Retensieregte en Plakkate – Oeroud en 
tog Modern” 2006 TSAR 32  Like the Supreme Court of Appeal (see the discussion below), Sonnekus 
accepts the continued relevance and authority of the Placaeten for current South African law as a given  
Sonnekus recognizes that reliance upon De Beers Consolidated Mines v London and SA Exploration 
Co (1893) 10 SC 359 is weakened by the fact that the Court’s remarks about the applicability of the 
Placaeten to urban leases were obiter; he also points out (as the Supreme Court of Appeal did in 
Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 6 SA 605 (SCA)) 
that Van der Keessel’s position in Theses Selectae is balanced out by the more restrictive view that 
he adopted in the Praelectiones (ad Grotium) (Sonnekus 2006 TSAR 50)  He also recognizes that the 
Privy Council did not in fact confirm the decision in De Beers on an interpretation of the common law 
(Sonnekus 2006 TSAR 51)  However, he finds a strong argument in favour of wide application of the 
Placaeten in a source that is ignored by most (academic and judicial) commentators, namely aa 31-34 of 
the Politieke Ordonnantie of 1 April 1580 (Sonnekus 2006 TSAR 39-40)  As he points out, the Politieke 
Ordonnantie is an important source of South African common law and, whereas the wording of the 
Placaeten may have given rise to different interpretations, a 33 of the Politieke Ordonnantie (repeated 
in the introductions of the 1658 and 1696 Placaeten) makes it clear that the restrictions applied to 
lessees of all immovable property (Sonnekus 2006 TSAR 44, 47)  Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, Sonnekus finds evidence in the early sources that the legislative intention behind the restric-
tions on compensation was to rectify a problem that occurred on both rural and urban land (Sonnekus 
2006 TSAR 47)
38 Without the benefit of Sonnekus’ article in print; the publication date of the relevant issue of the journal 
and the date of the decision coincided almost perfectly
39 Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 6 SA 605 
(SCA)  
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leases was wrong in law40 and it could not be upheld on the basis of established 
practice either, since it was not in fact backed up by unbroken or uniform prac-
tice.41 The Supreme Court of Appeal thus established that the Placaeten do 
not apply to urban land, which means that urban lessees can in principle claim 
compensation for improvements made without the consent of the landowner 
– and exercise a lien to enforce their claim – without the restrictions imposed 
by the Placaeten. As Sonnekus indicates, this means that urban landowners 
are at least in principle exposed to burdensome compensation claims – backed 
up by liens – for improvements to their property that they neither authorised 
nor wanted. It therefore becomes important for landlords of urban residen-
tial property to ensure that compensation claims and liens for unauthorised 
improvements are clearly excluded in the lease.
Again, this may look like a purely technical issue relating to private land use 
rights that derives from and should be settled by private law; in this case the law 
pertaining to urban residential rental contracts. However, besides the obvious 
significance of the doctrinal and practical issues, this debate is interesting for an 
analysis of property rules and practices that promote social justice, good citizen-
ship, and sustainable and supportive communities, because the rules involved 
and the divergent interpretations of them have always been aimed at establish-
ing or reinforcing a certain view of social justice. Historically, the Placaeten of 
1658 and 1696 are usually said to have been enacted to counter malpractices by 
lessees who abused the availability of a lien, based on an enrichment claim for 
improvements to the rental property, to prevent landowners from evicting them, 
particularly in instances where the landlord might have been unable to pay com-
pensation for expensive improvements that she did not want.42 The Placaeten 
40 Paras 6-35  The decision in De Beers Consolidated Mines v London and SA Exploration Co (1893) 10 SC 
359 (and its “confirmation” by the Privy Council), later confirmed in Van Wezel v Van Wezel’s Trustee 
1924 AD 409 416, became the main authority for favouring the wider applicability of the Placaeten (and 
also for the decision in the case a quo); see n 37 above  However, the Supreme Court of Appeal regarded 
the two reasons offered for including urban leases under these rules unconvincing  First, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal argued, this finding in De Beers was obiter because the issue for determination in 
De Beers turned on the lease agreement and not the common law  Second, the fairness argument was 
unconvincing because it was clear from the sources that the abuse that the Placaeten sought to counter 
(extensive improvement of agricultural land, with the result that the owner would be unable to compen-
sate the former lessee for the improvements and hence be unable to reclaim possession) was unheard of in 
urban leases (where similar improvements were less likely)  Third, the Supreme Court of Appeal found 
the De Beers interpretation of Van der Keessel’s position in Theses Selectae on the applicability of the 
Placaeten unconvincing because of the restrictive view that he adopted in the Praelectiones (ad Grotium), 
where he stated clearly that the Placaeten applied to agricultural land  Finally, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal rejected the view that the approach in De Beers was subsequently confirmed on appeal to the 
Privy Council, since the Privy Council also decided the matter on the interpretation of the contract and 
did not express a view on South African common law  Since the statement in Van Wezel about the applica-
bility of the Placaeten to urban leases was also obiter, the only real Appellate Division- or Supreme Court 
of Appeal-level authority on the point is in fact Spies v Lombard 1950 3 SA 469 (A) 484C-D, where it was 
said clearly that the Placaeten applied to rural leases only
41 Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 6 SA 605 (SCA) para 
45  According to the decision in Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73 92, misinterpretations of the common law 
can only be allowed to stand, once the error has been discovered, if the previous usage based on error can 
be described as a uniform and unbroken tradition  In the current situation, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
argued, such a uniform and unbroken line never existed, and hence it cannot be said that it is widely 
accepted that the Placaeten apply to urban leases
42 This is known as enforced enrichment (aufgedrängte Bereicherung) in German law; see Westermann, 
Gursky & Eickmann Westermann Sachenrecht 7 ed (1998) 447; Baur & Stürner Baur Sachenrecht 17 ed 
(1999) 638  
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therefore, in an effort to curb the abuses, restricted claims for compensation to 
improvements that were effected with the (prior or subsequent) consent of the 
landowner and required lessees to vacate the property before instituting such 
claims. It also abolished any lien or right of retention with regard to such claims, 
providing instead that the lessee who made the improvements could remove 
them before termination of the lease, provided that removal did not damage the 
rental property.43 In other words, both the rules existing before the Placaeten 
and the amendments brought about by them can be seen as social engineering 
mechanisms aimed at changing the relationship between two classes of prop-
erty holders, namely those with investments and home interests respectively 
(in Fox’s terminology), according to a specific socio-political goal (namely to 
prevent poor landowners from being held at ransom by shrewd lessees). It can 
therefore be argued that when reconsidering the scope and effect of these rules 
and amendments we should pay attention to the current status of the groups 
involved, the relationship between them and the socio-political goals that 
inspired the change brought about by the Placaeten.
In Western European legal systems this problem is now regulated by 
codification or dedicated legislation which, by and large, confirms the 
general principles embodied in the Placaeten, namely that lessees must have 
the landlord’s consent for any but the most trivial improvements; that they 
may remove such improvements before the end of the term provided they 
do not damage the property; and that compensation for improvements not 
removed is restricted to instances covered by consent and mutual agreement.44 
Liens for compensation claims are either excluded or restricted to a few care-
fully circumscribed instances. Generally speaking, the statutory restrictions 
imposed by (for instance) Dutch and German law apply also (perhaps even 
primarily) to urban leases, which means that the regime considered most 
suitable for urban rental properties by modern Western European legislatures 
resembles the practice that was assumed to have existed in South Africa prior 
to Business Aviation Corporation45 and propagated by Sonnekus, as opposed 
to the regime that applies in South Africa according to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal decision. Given these resemblances, it is tempting to conclude that the 
arrangement by which both rural and urban lessees are generally discouraged 
from making improvements to the land without the consent or permission 
43 On the historical background see in general Cooper Landlord and Tenant 2 ed (1994) 328 et seq
44 Compare a 7:215 BW (Dutch Civil Code): without written consent of the lessor (which may not be withheld 
unreasonably), the lessee may only make minor or small changes or improvements (that can be removed 
easily without significant cost or damage and that would not affect the rental potential of the property) to 
the property; such minor improvements and improvements made with consent may be removed during 
the term of the lease  In German law the tenant may also only make minor improvements (which can be 
removed without damage) without permission and, apart from improvements to rectify a material defect 
in the lease property, for which the lessee has both a right of removal and a compensation claim (§ 536a 
BGB (German Civil Code)); compensation is possible only if improvements have been authorised by the 
landlord  This construction is based on the absence of a compensation duty (§ 951 BGB) whenever the 
landowner has a right to demand removal of the improvements (§§ 1002, 1004 BGB); see Baur & Stürner 
Baur Sachenrecht 638  Similar rules apply in common law, albeit that the focus is on the tenant’s right to 
remove attached movables and there is no question of a compensation claim for improvements that were 
not removed in time; compare Gray & Gray Elements of Land Law 4 ed (2005) 1 84-1 86; Ziff Principles 
of Property Law 4 ed (2006) 104-105
45 Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 6 SA 605 (SCA)  
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of the landlord is the best possible regime for regulating improvements by 
lessees. In other words, Sonnekus is correct and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
wrong. However, such a general conclusion needs to be qualified.
It is true that the South African law and practice in this area are now out of 
sync with other modern systems, which is problematic in itself. What makes 
it worse is that the decision in Business Aviation Corporation, which brought 
about this state of affairs, does not seem to offer any particular policy or socio-
political argument to justify the current position – the only justification seems 
to be a specific interpretation of the sources or legal tradition. It is curious that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal should think that the current legal position in 
South Africa should still depend purely on the correct doctrinal interpretation of 
Roman-Dutch laws, such as those promulgated in the Placaeten; it is even more 
curious to argue that current interpretations should be compared with the social 
conditions prevailing when the Placaeten were promulgated for the Netherlands 
more than 300 years ago.46 Obviously, such a formalistic reliance upon a law 
promulgated more than three centuries ago in a different country on a distant 
continent cannot be supported abstractly, especially if one considers that the 
policy or socio-political arguments pertaining to this matter seem to support 
the opposite view, as demonstrated by modern legislation in other jurisdictions. 
At the very least a more overtly socio-political, policy-conscious analysis of the 
South African situation is called for.
However, having said that, one cannot simply conclude that the approach 
propagated by Sonnekus is to be preferred to the position of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal either. The landlord-tenant legislation adopted (and devel-
oped) in Western European legal systems since the end of World War I 
was introduced specifically to alleviate the post-war housing shortage and 
concomitant socio-economic problems, in other words with a particular 
socio-political goal in mind. In terms of post-war social-democratic housing 
policy, the aim of  landlord-tenant law was to establish a fair balance between 
the interests of society, private landlords and tenants, with particular attention 
for the generally weak and marginalised position of tenants who cannot afford 
to acquire access to housing under open market conditions.47 Modern Western 
European legislators opted, under these generally reformist, tenant-friendly 
circumstances, for a restrictive set of rules that protects landowners against 
46 In line with the earlier decision of the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Spies v Lombard 
1950 3 SA 469 (A) 484C-D, the rules derived from the Placaeten, including the rules that restricted the 
lessee’s claim for compensation and abolished the right of retention, have become part of South African 
common law; see Business Aviation Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rand Airport Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2006 6 SA 
605 (SCA) para 10
47 I am using very broad brush strokes here without much substantiation, but see the discussion of German 
Federal Constitutional Court decisions on social tenancy legislation in Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 135-139  It is true that the general tenant-friendly 
tendency in Western European law of the middle of the 20th century has been reversed to a certain extent 
by legislation since the 1980s; see eg Bright Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 595, who points 
out that almost 90% of new private rented lettings available to the public are shorthold tenancies, which 
means that a very significant percentage of tenants in the private sector are excluded from substantive 
statutory protections  Moreover, in Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983; Kay v 
London Borough of Lambeth; Leeds City Council v Price [2006] UKHL 10, the House of Lords was 
unwilling to interfere with policy decisions embodied in housing legislation and therefore refused to 
embark on an independent balancing exercise in individual cases
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compensation claims for improvements.48 Sonnekus did not support his 
admittedly similar approach with an appeal to the same policy reasons – like 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, he relied mostly on what he saw as the better 
interpretation of the historical sources. Sonnekus argues that the Placaeten 
were originally intended to combat abuses by deceitful and fraudulent lessees; 
that the intention was to protect the landowner against such abuses; and that 
the result was – and still is – fair, because the restrictions left enough room for 
lessees with a genuine claim for compensation (for improvements made with 
the landowner’s consent). He proposes that the Placaeten and their effects 
should be regarded as legitimate state interferences in the private landlord-
tenant relationship because they still deliver a balanced and just result.
This argument is unconvincing because it ignores context, simply assuming 
that the original justification for the restrictions (the original power relation-
ship between landlord and tenant, which made it possible for tenants to abuse 
landlords’ legal and financial situation) still holds, which is arguably not the 
case. If anything, the original power relationship between landlord and tenant 
that gave birth to the restrictions in the Placaeten was probably reversed (at 
least as far as urban tenancies are concerned) by the time of the Industrial 
Revolution. Many tenants are nowadays poor and more vulnerable to abuse 
from landlords, especially in urban settings, and above all in South Africa, 
where the weakness of tenancy has been exacerbated by apartheid laws and 
practices. In the absence of modern codification or legislation, the ancient 
laws have to be interpreted and applied with greater sensitivity for social, 
economic and political context, even if one agrees with Sonnekus (like most 
modern Western European legislators do) that the restrictions should apply to 
urban residential leases. The legal position that Sonnekus pleads for (retention 
of the restrictions) seems sound and in line with tendencies in most modern 
systems, but his argument in support of this position is doctrinally just as 
formalistic and politically just as questionable as that of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, which decided in favour of the opposite position with the same 
disregard for social context but on the basis of a different interpretation of 
historical authority.
In a nutshell, therefore, one could probably support Sonnekus rather than the 
Supreme Court of Appeal as far as the choice of a legal regime is concerned, 
but neither is convincing as far as the reasons for their respective positions are 
concerned. More and better socio-political and policy-conscious research and 
argument is required to substantiate the choice between the two positions in 
the current South African context.
Moreover, it may be necessary to reconsider the seemingly strong argu-
ments in favour of restrictions on compensation claims altogether, at least 
in the land reform context. The question whether the fraught relationship 
48 I am specifically not making any historical claims here; it is possible that the codified versions of German 
(1900) and Dutch (1938 and 1992) law imposed these restrictions and that post–World War II amendments 
and legislation merely retained the traditional situation  My argument is that this would have to be regarded 
as a conscious decision in view of the fundamental changes that were made to landlord-tenant laws in the 
postwar period; it cannot be equated with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s – or Sonnekus’ – argument that 
the South African situation should remain the same despite large-scale social and economic reforms
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between landlord and tenant should still be regulated by a seemingly quaint 
and outdated legal tradition acquires special poignancy in view of the history 
of apartheid land law. The abuses to which lessees and other socially and 
economically weak occupiers of residential land were subjected under apart-
heid land law require extraordinary care when reconsidering or reconfirming 
the respective legal positions of landowners and residential tenants in the 
post-1994 land reform era.49 Although land reform was not at stake in any of 
the recent South African improvement cases, it is possible to construe a land 
reform-sensitive argument concerning the social fairness of the restrictions 
imposed by the Placaeten. Without going into too much detail, two examples 
may be cited of considerations that might arise if the problem of compensation 
for unauthorised improvements to rental property were ever reconsidered in a 
land reform context. In fact, the considerations I have in mind might make it 
necessary to consider the suitability of the Placaeten even in rural areas.
The first example is the distinction, made in modern German law, between 
improvements made for the pleasure and luxury of the tenant versus improve-
ments made to rectify shortcomings in the rental property not attended to by 
the landlord.50 A moment’s contemplation should indicate that the two situa-
tions are different and that a compensation claim (and possibly a lien) should 
be more readily available in the second case than in the first. Many apartheid 
tenancies, especially where the local or provincial authority was the landlord, 
would have involved renting either a bare piece of land or a very rudimentary 
structure, which would make it much easier to argue in favour of allowing 
even unauthorised improvements by the tenant to make the property (more, or 
even barely) habitable. With reference to the particular facts and the historical 
context, the question would then be whether this distinction is relevant in a 
particular land reform compensation case, but to my knowledge it has never 
been raised in the context of the Placaeten before.
The second consideration that might require rethinking the compensation 
issue and the relationship between landlord and tenant in a land reform set-
ting is illustrated by a recent decision of the High Court of Ireland. In John 
E Shirley v AO Gorman51 the High Court had to scrutinise the Landlord and 
49 This statement can be justified in terms of the 1996 Constitution  According to s 8(3):
   “In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and juristic persons in terms of subsection 
(2), a court –
   (a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or where necessary, develop, the common 
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and
   (b)  may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided the limitation is in accordance 
with section 36(1)”;
 and s 39(2):
   “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights ”
  See further the Constitutional Court’s approach in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 1 SA 217 (CC), where it was said that ss 25 and 26 had to be interpreted together, with due regard for 
both the historical and the constitutional context, when adjudicating a conflict between a landowner and 
an occupier
50 See n 44
51 [2006] IEHC 27  Compare the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in James v United Kingdom 
[1986] 8 EHRR 123, which concerned a similar set of circumstances; see further the US Supreme Court 
decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984)
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Tenant (Amendment) Act 1984, which provides a mechanism whereby ten-
ants who qualify can acquire the fee simple interest by paying the landlord a 
prescribed percentage of the current value of the lease (as defined in the Act). 
The Court decided that the transfers authorised by the Act are not instances 
of compulsory acquisition. However, they are justified by the social justice 
principle of reforming the landlord-tenant relationship, partly by abolish-
ing ancient “pyramid” interests of landlords who see their property interest 
purely as an income stream and who are not responsible for the maintenance 
or upkeep of the property; and partly by securing the investment of long-
standing tenants who have either built any or most structures on the property 
in the first place or improved them beyond recognition and who might in any 
event be entitled to a reversionary lease under older social tenancy legisla-
tion.52 This means that certain landlord-tenant relationships have evolved in 
such a way that the landlord retains nothing more than an investment interest 
in the income stream from the tenancy, whereas the tenant has made all or the 
majority of the improvements that constitute the current character and value 
of the property and therefore holds much more than a contractual use right. 
The Irish legislature, like the English legislature, simplified land tenure by 
unifying those two interests in the hands of the tenant; the Irish High Court 
considered this a constitutionally justified implementation of the social justice 
principle.
This kind of development is not new to civil law systems either; similar 
“shifts in landownership” have been described and justified in Roman-Dutch 
law, referring to post-feudal instances where the interest of the landlord 
(symbolised in what eventually becomes a largely token rent) has become neg-
ligible or purely symbolic, while the interest of the actual user of the land has 
acquired the characteristics of ownership in all but form.53 In the  chequered 
history of Roman-Dutch land law, ownership has therefore sometimes been 
allowed to shift from the titular owner to the de facto user; the Irish case 
demonstrates that similar shifts are still considered necessary and justified in 
other legal systems. The question should be: should we acknowledge that (at 
least some) apartheid land users have acquired all the characteristic entitle-
ments of ownership through their investment in the property and the duration 
of their occupation, so that a shift in landownership from landlord to tenant 
has taken place, and could this have any effect on the land reform process as it 
has hitherto been conceived? The issue has particular interest in cases where 
a state authority held ownership title of the land because of the management 
of tribal or “Black” land under apartheid legislation and practices, while the 
actual users and occupiers of the land went about their business as if nothing 
52 Interestingly, the reforms are not limited to residential or agricultural tenancies or designed to benefit 
poor, socially weak or marginalised tenants, although the Court decided that the statutory scheme nev-
ertheless forms part of a larger “continuum of legislation all of which was designed in different ways to 
improve … the position of tenants”: see John E Shirley v AO Gorman [2006] IEHC 27, 42  Significant 
tenant-friendly legislative initiatives of the post-war period have been reversed to a certain extent by 
developments since the 1980s; see n 46 above
53 See Van Iterson “Beschouwingen over Rolverwisseling of Eigendomsverschuiving” in Verslagen en 
Mededelingen van de Vereniging tot Uitgave van het Oud-Vaderlands Recht (1971) 13 no 3, 407  
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had changed since time immemorial.54 By considering the resurrection of the 
notion of shifts in landownership, new and exciting possibilities could perhaps 
be created for promoting change and reform in land law that could support – 
rather than frustrate – citizenship, social justice and community.
In this regard it is again useful to consider the point made by Lorna Fox 
with reference to the tension between the home interest of occupiers and the 
investment interest of creditors: developing property rules and practices so 
as to foster citizenship, social justice and the building of sustainable and sup-
portive communities might very well require reconsideration of the balance to 
be struck between the investment interests of landlords and the home interests 
of tenants, but conceptualising the correct balance requires development of 
a suitable theoretical framework.55 I return to this aspect in the concluding 
section.
4  Gravesites on private agricultural land
My third example concerns public or constitutional law and land reform in 
a more obvious and direct fashion and is perhaps more uniquely South African 
than the first two. During the first decade of post-apartheid land reform, ten-
sion between white owners and Black occupiers56 of agricultural land was 
one of the most intractable problems confronting policy makers and judges 
alike. Apart from occupation rights and security of tenure, perhaps the most 
controversial issue was the question whether occupiers of private farmland 
(farm workers or former farm workers) have burial rights, in accordance with 
customary law and practice, for themselves and family members on the farm 
where they live or work. This problem becomes particularly fraught when the 
farm owner refuses permission for a burial, which was often the case when 
the family no longer lived or worked on the farm or when the deceased was a 
family member who did not work or live on the farm.
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, which regulates the 
occupation rights of occupiers who reside on the land with the owner’s permis-
sion (which includes most farm workers or agricultural labourers), gave farm 
workers a right to visit and maintain family graves on the land,57 but originally 
this did not include the right to bury occupiers or their family members on 
54 There is evidence that land rights regimes introduced to African countries by colonial authorities have 
been ignored wholesale by the actual occupiers and users of the land; see Mattei “Socialist and Non-
Socialist Approaches to Land Law: Continuity and Change in Somalia and other African States” 1990 
(16) Rev of Socialist Law 17  At the same time, there are empirical indications that Black South African 
land users, at least in the rural areas (but the same probably holds true in urban areas), ignored the 
restrictions of the land rights regime imposed upon them by apartheid and created their own “informal 
freehold” system that ran counter to both the official customary land rights regime and the superimposed 
Roman-Dutch legal system; see Cross “Freehold in the ‘Homelands’: What are the Real Constraints?” 
in Cross & Haines (eds) Towards Freehold: Options for Land and Development in South Africa’s Black 
Rural Areas (1988) 342
55 Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies
56 Especially farm labourers and former farm labourers  The issues between farm owners and farm labourers 
are familiar to foreign lawyers working in the general area of labour-related tenancies, eg whether former 
labourers whose labour contracts have been terminated lose their right to occupy residential property on 
the farm; whether family members of workers who have been dismissed or who have died or have become 
unable to continue working because of old age or illness lose their occupation rights; etc  
57 S 6(4)
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the land. Various High Courts held that, without sufficiently clear legislative 
authority, enforcement of such a burial right against the owner’s wishes and 
without her consent would bring about too much of an encroachment on the 
right of the landowner for the courts to read such a right into the Act by way 
of extensive interpretation. Consequently, it was assumed that occupiers and 
their family members could not be buried without the landowner’s permission 
and that the landowner could withhold permission as one of the privileges of 
ownership.58
In 2001 the Act was amended by inserting a provision that now allows 
burial of occupiers and their family members on the land in accordance with 
the occupiers’ religious and cultural beliefs, provided that an established 
practice exists in that the landowner previously routinely gave permission 
for burials.59 The occupier enjoys this right in balance with the rights of the 
owner and subject to reasonable conditions that may be imposed by the owner 
or person in charge.60 The constitutional validity of this new provision was 
attacked in Nhlabati v Fick,61 the landowner arguing that section 6(2)(dA) was 
unconstitutional because it violated the protection of the landowner’s right in 
section 25 of the Constitution.62 The Land Claims Court rejected the property 
argument, concluding that section 6(2)(dA) did not authorize an arbitrary dep-
rivation of property because it struck the required balance between the rights 
of the landowner and the rights of the occupiers.
The Land Claims Court considered this argument against the background 
of the Constitutional Court decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance.63 In view of the analysis 
of the phrase “arbitrary deprivation” in FNB64 the Court decided that section 
6(2)(dA) does not authorise arbitrary appropriation (deprivation)65 of a grave, 
because the right to appropriate a grave must be balanced with the right of the 
owner, which means that the right of the owner could in certain circumstances 
conceivably outweigh the right to a grave.66 Furthermore, the Court consid-
58 Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 (LCC); Bührmann v Nkosi 2000 1 SA 145 (T); the latter confirmed 
in Nkosi v Bührmann 2002 1 SA 372 (SCA)  See Van der Walt “Property Rights v Religious Rights: 
Bührmann v Nkosi” 2002 Stell LR 394; Roux “Pro-Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: Explaining the 
Performance of the South African Land Claims Court” 2004 SAJHR 511 527-530
59 “Established practice” is defined in s 1 as a practice in terms of which the owner or person in charge of 
the land or her predecessor in title routinely gave permission to people living on the land to bury deceased 
members of their family on that land in accordance with their religion or cultural belief
60 S 6(2)(dA) as amended by the Land Affairs General Amendment Act 51 of 2001
61 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC); see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 325-326, 344 et seq
62 Another ground for the application was the allegation that the new section intruded upon a functional area 
of exclusive provincial legislative competence
63 2002 4 SA 768 (CC)  
64 The First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) methodology requires the 
court to consider the possibility of unconstitutional deprivation first, raising the issue of unconstitutional 
expropriation only if there is no such deprivation or if it could be justified under s 36  
65 In the South African context (s 25(1)) this term refers to what is sometimes called regulatory restrictions 
on the use of property  In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) 
the Constitutional Court’s approach was that deprivations constitute a wide category that includes both 
uncompensated regulatory restrictions and compensated expropriations or compulsory acquisitions
66 Nhlabati v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC) para 31
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ered the facts that an occupier has the right to establish a grave only if there 
is an established practice of giving permission for burials, which presupposes 
some kind of pre-existing consensus between the landowner and the occupi-
ers about burials;67 that the establishment of the grave would in most cases 
constitute a relatively minor intrusion into the landowner’s property rights;68 
and that the right to bury an occupier or a family member according to section 
6(2)(dA) was enacted to fulfil the state’s constitutional mandate to provide 
occupiers legally secure tenure. Considering the importance of the religious 
or cultural beliefs of many occupiers regarding burial of family members 
close to their residence, the constitutional mandate would in most cases be 
sufficient to justify the deprivation of some incidents of ownership.69
Again in line with the FNB approach, the Court next considered the pos-
sibility that section 6(2)(dA) might constitute or authorise an uncompensated 
and hence unconstitutional expropriation of property. In its earlier Serole deci-
sion70 the Land Claims Court stated that the granting of a right to establish a 
grave as of right would amount to the granting of a servitude, which would 
amount to a de facto expropriation without compensation. In Nhlabati v Fick 
the Court again considered this argument and its implications for the consti-
tutional validity of section 6(2)(dA), without deciding that the section indeed 
amounted to such an expropriation.71 The Court pointed out that statutory 
permission for what amounts to an expropriation of a right could either imply 
that compensation was due or that the absence of compensation was justifiable 
under section 36 of the Constitution. It concluded that the statutory obligation 
of a landowner to allow an occupier to appropriate a gravesite on her land 
without compensation would be reasonable and justifiable as meant in section 
36, even in the absence of compensation, having regard to the following cir-
cumstances: the right does not constitute a major intrusion on the landowner’s 
property rights; the right is subject to balancing with the landowner’s property 
rights and may sometimes be subject to them; the right exists only where 
there is an established past practice with regard to grave sites; and the right 
will enable occupiers to comply with religious or cultural beliefs that form 
an important part of their security of tenure, and giving statutory recognition 
to their security of tenure is in accordance with the constitutional mandate.72 
Accordingly, even if one accepted that section 6(2)(dA) authorised expropria-
tion of grave sites without compensation, which on the face of it is in conflict 
with section 25 of the Constitution, this result would be reasonable and justifi-
67 Para 31  It is not required that the owner must have allowed the occupier or family involved in a specific 
dispute to bury their family members in the past – the question is merely whether burials of occupiers 
took place in the past or not  Moreover, it is the owner of the land in the abstract sense that is involved and 
not the specific owner at the time of a particular dispute; a practice would also be established if previous 
owners or other persons in charge of the farm allowed burials
68 Para 31
69 Para 31
70 See Serole v Pienaar 2000 1 SA 328 (LCC) para 16 (335D)  Serole was decided by Gildenhuys J, who was 
again one of the judges in Nhlabati v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC)
71 Nhlabati v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC) paras 32-35
72 Para 35
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able under section 36 of the Constitution. The constitutional challenge against 
section 6(2)(dA) was consequently dismissed.
The Court’s assumption (without deciding the issue) that the establishment 
of a grave site in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of the Act could constitute an 
expropriation of a servitude without compensation may be debatable, but the 
interesting aspect of the decision is that the Court decided the constitutional 
challenge with reference to the social context and the reform-oriented nature 
of the Act, instead of simply dealing with the matter against the background of 
the presumed inviolability of the common law right of ownership. The decision 
that section 6(2)(dA) would be justified even if it established an expropriation 
of private land without compensation was a courageous one that reflects the 
Court’s thorough appreciation of the full implications of the Constitution’s 
transformative ideals; in this regard Nhlabati may be said to develop land law 
in a way that has the potential to promote citizenship, social justice and the 
building of sustainable and supporting communities.
5  Concluding remarks
There are probably quite a few countries, including (but by no means 
restricted to) new or emerging democracies, where politicians, lawyers and 
civil society leaders alike hope that property, among other institutions and 
practices, can foster democratic forms of governance, advance social justice, 
promote citizenship, build sustainable and supportive communities, and 
enhance stewardship of the global environment and its natural resources. 
Perhaps the hope that property would play a particularly significant role in this 
regard is based on the fact that property either played a large part in destroy-
ing or suppressing these social goods in the past or at least demonstrated their 
absence most glaringly by upholding and entrenching the divide between rich 
and poor, powerful and powerless. South Africa is one country for which both 
these statements are true.
I selected the examples I discuss above for at least two reasons. First, the 
last example from case law on the right to a burial on privately owned agri-
cultural land exemplifies what one might describe as good practice in current 
reform-driven adjudication on transformative constitutionalism.73 Both the 
legislation involved (section 6(2)(dA) of the amended Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act) and the decision of the Land Claims Court in Nhlabati v Fick 
demonstrate the kind of context-sensitive and Constitution-conscious reaction 
to existing law and the need for meaningful reform that is required to confront 
the legacy of apartheid and create space for the advancement of social justice 
and the promotion of citizenship and community. I would argue that much of 
the affective and attitudinal characteristics demonstrated by legislature and 
court in this example would bear scrutiny and consideration in other jurisdic-
73 The phrase is from Klare 1998 SAJHR 146, an enormously influential critique of South African legal 
culture and assessment of the possibilities for realising the transformative goals set out in the 1996 
Constitution  
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tions where development of these or similar social values and goods might 
also be in demand.
My first two examples were selected for a different purpose. Neither of 
them is obviously or directly relevant to the promotion of citizenship or com-
munity and, apart from the Jaftha decision of the Constitutional Court, neither 
demonstrates any particularly hopeful indication of good practice that could 
guide property lawyers in making their contribution towards these goals. In 
that sense my conclusion from these examples – and my purpose in including 
them here – is what probably also inspired Lorna Fox when she lamented the 
absence of a suitable “organising framework” in property theory with which a 
convincing argument could be made, when necessary, in support of the occu-
pier’s home interest as against the creditor’s commercial claim to realise the 
capital value of the property.74
It appears problematic that public law (including constitutional law, human 
rights law, administrative law and related fields) has already produced (or at 
least started producing) the kind of theory that Fox refers to, but so far not 
enough has been done in the areas of private and commercial law. Even worse, 
the “hard core” of private law doctrine is often considered free of this kind 
of “mushy” socio-political theorising. As a result, property law in particular 
is often still dominated by facile and outdated notions of absolute ownership 
or the overarching economic importance of security of title, which usually 
results in falling back into what Gregory Alexander refers to as “the formalist 
trap”.75 Opportunities to consider and debate possible reforms or changes in 
what may otherwise look like purely technical legal regimes are lost in the 
process. The traditional argument that Sonnekus offers in support of restric-
tions imposed on compensation claims against the landlord for unauthorised 
improvements76 demonstrates the problem quite nicely: Sonnekus argues, 
primarily for doctrinal reasons, in favour of restrictions that are also favoured 
by most current Western European systems, albeit for functional rather than 
traditional reasons. Moreover, the modern statutory instruments that imposed 
these restrictions did so consciously, within a tenant-friendly regime that is 
certainly not primarily informed, as Sonnekus’ argument is, by the hierar-
chical supremacy of individual ownership. This proves that context-sensitive 
and reform-friendly analysis is not necessarily or fundamentally opposed 
to individual ownership or that it would always produce outcomes against 
the owner.77 However, when room is left for further reflection on what may 
seem like a straightforward, purely technical doctrinal matter, historical and 
74 Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies 12  See the discussion in the first example 
above  
75 Alexander The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence 
24 et seq describes this trap as “the assumption or claim that without constitutional protection, property 
rights are unlikely to enjoy the degree of security and stability that is necessary for a properly functioning 
liberal democracy as well as for an efficient free market economy”
76 See the discussion of the second example above  
77 The same conclusion was reached in a very important South African Constitutional Court decision on 
eviction, namely Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), where it was said 
that considering the justifiability of granting an eviction order against the backdrop of all the relevant 
circumstances does not mean that eviction is rendered impossible, even when the evictees have no access 
to alternative accommodation
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context-sensitive analysis suggests that there may be reasons why the seem-
ingly rational and fair regime preferred by Sonnekus and the modern Western 
European legislators could be inappropriate in land reform contexts, at least 
some of the time. In such a context, the required balance between sustainable 
economic development, building of supportive communities and social jus-
tice might be different than in contemporary Western European or even other 
developing jurisdictions. Nevertheless, even then it might prove valuable to 
consider and evaluate the merit of policy choices made during the postwar 
housing crisis in Western Europe.
Fox is certainly correct when she says that we need a suitable “organising 
framework” in property theory with which a convincing argument could be 
made, when necessary, in support of non-ownership or non-property “home” 
interests and against firmly established and traditionally revered and prized 
ownership or real rights. At a time when context-sensitive decisions to that 
effect are clearly required by the demands of social justice, citizenship and 
community, this is indeed a serious shortcoming that deserves our urgent 
and dedicated attention. Property theorists can only make a contribution to 
this debate if they can succeed in creating room for critical reflection even in 
the seemingly most politics-neutral dark corners of private law doctrine and 
tradition.78
Summary
The article examines the ability of property to advance social justice, promote citizenship and 
build sustainable and supportive communities, particularly in post-apartheid South Africa. Under 
the apartheid system property law was one of the mechanisms that undermined social justice and 
citizenship, but the 1996 Constitution requires that the law be developed in a way that would promote 
the constitutional goals of freedom, equality and human dignity. The article investigates three recent 
examples from legislation and case law, two from private law and one from land reform, in which the 
law arguably was or could have been developed so as to reverse the legacy of apartheid and promote 
social justice and citizenship, in line with the transformative goals of the Constitution. The examples 
involve judicial scrutiny of attachment and sale in execution of residential property; compensation 
for improvements to immovable property made by a lessee without the permission of the landlord; 
and the establishment of graves and burial sites on agricultural land without the permission of the 
landowner. The conclusion points out that these examples demonstrate wide-ranging possibilities for 
context-sensitive and constitution-conscious development of existing law that can create space for the 
advancement of social justice and the promotion of citizenship and community, even in what might 
initially appear to be politically neutral and narrow doctrinal disputes.
78 I hope to develop the theoretical foundations and the arguments raised here further in Property in the 
Margins (forthcoming, Hart Publishing, Oxford)
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